

Message Text

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FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR: US-SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON DECEMBER 15, 1976

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: US REP AND DEPREP MET WITH SOVIET REPS
TARASOV AND SHUSTOV FOR END-OF-ROUND DISCUSSION ON DECEMBER 15,
DIRECTLY FOLLOWING THE INFORMAL SESSION IN WHICH THE WEST HAS
TABLED UPDATED DATA FOR WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

2. SOVIET REPS ASKED SOME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON THE WESTERN
DATA. THERE WAS A GENERAL AND INCONCLUSIVE DISCUSSION OF EASTERN
AND WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACHES DURING WHICH SOVIETS AGAIN
PLACED MAJOR EMPHAIS ON THEIR OPPOSITION TO REDUCTION OF A
SOVIET TANK ARMY. TARASOV ALSO COMPLAINED OF THE INEQUITY OF
THE WESTERN DISIRE TO PLACE THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION
AREA UNDER AN INDIVIDUAL CEILING WHILE FRG FORCES WOULD BE
SUBJECT ONLY TO A COLLECTIVE CEILING. IN VIEW OF INTEREST
OF WASHINGTON AGENCIES IN SOVIET VIEWS ON WESTERN DATA, THIS
REPORT IS BEING SENT BY TELEGRAM. END SUMMARY.

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3. AT BEGINNING OF DISCUSSION, SHUSTOV ASKED IF FRENCH FORCES
IN WEST BERLIN WERE ALSO NO LONGER INCLUDED IN THE NEW WESTERN
DATA. US REP SAID THIS WAS CORRECT. NO FRENCH FORCES IN THE
REDUCTION AREA WERE INCLUDED IN THE UPDATED WESTERN DATA.
TARASOV ASKED WHETHER IT WAS CORRECT THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS

STILL ENVISAGED A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES SET AT THE SAME FIGURE AS PREVIOUSLY. US REP SAID THIS WAS THE CASE. TARASOV ASKED WHETHER NON-PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE COMMON CEILING. US REP SAID THAT WHAT WESTERN REPS HAD SAID BEFORE ON THIS TOPIC STILL HELD. TARASOV SAID, THEN THE WEST PROPOSED A COMMON CEILING AT 700,000 MEN WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE FRENCH FORCES ON THE WESTERN SIDE. US REP REPEATED THE RESPONSE THAT WHAT WESTERN REPS HAD SAID BEFORE ON THIS TOPIC STIDYM STOOD.

4. SHUSTOV ASKED, THEN WOULD THE WEST REDUCE FROM 731,000 MEN? US REP SAID THE WESTERN REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT DECREASE AND THEY WOULD BE CALCULATED IN THE SAME WAY AS BEFORE. TARASOV SAID THAT MEANT THE WESTERN GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE FROM A LEVEL OF 791,000. US REP SAID WESTERN FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THEIR TOTAL AT THE TIME AGREED ON AS A STARTING POINT FOR REDUCTIONS TO WHATEVER SPECIFIC COMMON CEILING WAS AGREED. BUT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE METHOD OF CALCULATING WESTERN REDUCTIONS. TARASOV SAID THIS MEANT THE WEST WAS TAKING AN EXTRA BURDEN ON ITSELF. US REP AGREED.

5. SHUSTOV SAID HE FORESAW SOME DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSLATION IN DEALING WITH WESTERN DATA CONCEPTS. THE WORD QUOTE UNIFORMED UNQUOTE HAD HAD BEEN ADDED FOR THE FIRST TIME. US REP SAID THAT THE USE OF THE WORD QUOTE UNIFORMED UNQUOTE WAS NOT INTENDED TO MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE AS REGARDS WESTERN COUNTING RULES. THE BASIC ELEMENT OF THESE COUNTING RULES WAS UNCHANGED. IT WAS THAT ALL ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INCLUDED.

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6. SHUSTOV ASKED IF THE WESTERN FIGURE OF 731,000 COVERED ALL OF THE FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA AS OF 1 JANUARY 1976. US REP SAID IT COVERED ALL ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA INCLUDING THOSE ASSIGNED TO UNITS IN THE AREA BUT TEMPORARILY ABSENT. SHUSTOV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NO SPECIFIC TERM WHICH WAS EQUIVALENT TO THE WESTERN PHRASE QUOTE ACTIVE DUTY UNQUOTE. US REP SAID ACTIVE DUTY SOLDIERS WERE FULL-TIME SOLDIERS AS DISTINGUISHED FROM RESERVISTS AND CIVILIANS.

7. TARASOV ASKED US REP HOW HE VISUALIZED THE DISCUSSION ON DATA. US REP SAID IT COULD BE DONE IN INFORMAL SESSIONS WITH MILITARY ADVISERS PRESENT. TARASOV OBSERVED THAT THIS MIGHT PREVENT DISCUSSION OF OTHER SUBJECT MATTER. US REP SAID THERE COULD BE ADVANCE AGREEMENT ON WHAT SUBJECTS WOULD BE TREATED IN THE INFORMALS. MOREOVER, THERE WAS NOTHING TO PRECLUDE DISCUSSION OF TOHER TOPICS WHEN MILITARY ADVISERS WERE PRESENT.

8. TARASOV SAID PARTICIPANTS SHOULD THINK OF WAYS OF ACCELERATING THEIR WORK. US REP SAID IT WOULD BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO HAVE MORE THAN ONE INFORMAL SESSION PER WEEK IF A REAL NEED AROSE. SHUSTOV SAID PARTICIPANTS SHOULD HAVE A PRACTICAL DISCUSSION OF NEGOTIATION TOPICS RATHER THAN CONTINUING WITH THE USELESS AND REPETITIVE GENERAL DISCUSSION. US REP SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH SOME SPECIFIC TOPICS. ONE MIGHT BE WHETHER IT WAS JUSTIFIABLE TO HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. ANOTHER MIGHT BE THE COLLECTIVITY ISSUE. SHUSTOV COMMENTED THAT THE PARITY ISSUE DEPENDED ON THE OUTCOME OF A DATA DISCUSSION SO IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION.

9. US DEPREP SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE SOVIETS WOULD DROP THEIR EXCESSIVE REQUIREMENT ON NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS REGARDS THEIR COMMITMENT IN A FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT COVERING THEIR STAGE TWO REDUCTIONS. POLISH REP HAD IN THE INFORMAL SESSION EARLIER SAME DAY ONCE AGAIN STATED THAT
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ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AGREE TO REDUCE BY EQUAL PERCENTAGES, TO USE THE SAME METHOD OF REDUCTIONS, TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS, AND SO ON. THIS WAS NOT SIGNING ON TO A GENERAL COMMITMENT, BUT THE WHOLE EASTERN PROGRAM. IF THE SOVIET UNION WANTED AN AGREEMENT, IT WOULD HAVE TO MAKE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS BELIEVE AN AGREEMENT WAS FEASIBLE. TO CREATE SUCH A BELIEF, IT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN MAKING CHANGES IN ITS PROGRAM. TARASOV OBSERVED THAT THE EAST WAS NOT INTERESTED IN WHAT STOOD ON PAPER BUT IN ACUTUAL REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN BY THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. COMMENT: THIS REMARK MIGHT REFER TO THE POSSIBLILTY OF SOME UNDERSTANDING OUTSIDE THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT. END COMMENT.

10. US REP SAID WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD HAD A DIFFICULT TIME IN AGREEING TO THE DECEMBER 1975 PROPOSALS. BY ANY REASONING, THIS DECEMBER MOVE WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANY STEP THAT THE EAST HAD TAKEN. SO IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE NEXT MOVE WAS UP TO THE EAST.

11. US REP SAID A MAJOR AND CONTINUING QUESTION WHEN HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON WAS WHAT THE SOVIET UNION REALLY WNATED IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON WERE ASKING FOR HARD EVIDENCE OF THE EASTERN INTEREST IN MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS. US REPS COULD FAIRLY TELL THEM THAT THE EAST WAS INTERESTED IN AN AGREEMENT IN THE TERMS WHICH THE EAST INSELF HAD PROPOSED, BUT NO MORE. SOME WOULD THINK THAT THE NEXT THREE YEARS OF NEGOTIATION WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE LAST THREE

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AND THEY WOULD WANT TO KNOW WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WAS SERIOUS IN WANTING A REAL OUTCOME. THIS WOULD MEAN CHANGES IN THE SOVIET POSITION. THE ATMOSPHERE AND TONE OF THE VIENNA TALKS WAS GOOD. BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL MOVE ON EITHER SIDE IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE OUTSET UNTIL THE WEST HAD MOVED IN DEC 1975. THE EAST HAD MADE NO COMMENSURATE MOVE.

12. US REP CONTINUED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WANTED TO SEARCH FOR A WAY TO FIND AN AGREEMENT. BUT THE REAL EVIDENCE FOR THIS HAD TO BE THROUGH ACTION. THE EAST SHOULD ACCEPT THE SELECTIVE APPROACH ON ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS. PARTICIPANTS COULD NEVER GET ANYWHERE WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH. THE EAST HAD MORE ARTILLERY, TANKS, AIRCRAFT, AND OTHER MAJOR WEAPONS IN THE AREA THAN THE WEST. THE WEST COULD NOT CONTRACTUALIZE THESE SUPERIORITIES. THERE WAS A NEED FOR A SELECTIVE APPROACH. AS REGARDS COLLECTIVITY, THE WEST HAD TO HAVE A WAY OF KEEPING UP THE 700,000 FIGURE. THE SOVIETS SHOULD STOP POSING EXCESSIVE DEMANDS AS REGARDS THE GENERAL COMMITMENT BY THE ALLIES AND DEFER TO A SECOND NEGOTIATION SUCH
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MATTERS AS REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND METHOD OF REDUCTION.

THESE WERE SAMPLES OF THINGS THE EAST COULD DO.

13. TARASOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WHEN US REP RETURNED HOME HE HAD TO MAKE AN ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN POSITION. THERE WERE TWO APPROACHES TO THIS. ONE APPROACH WAS TO ANALYZE THE ENTIRE EASTERN PROPOSALS TABLED SINCE THE OUTSET UP TO THE PRESENT, INCLUDING THE LATEST PROPOSAL OF FEB 19, 1976 AND ALSO TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE EAST HAD TABLED DATA ON JUNE 10. THIS APPROACH WOULD ENABLE US REP TO COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT AGREE WITH THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, BUT WERE SEEKING IN THEIR OWN WAY TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

14. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT THE SECOND WAY OF ANALYSIS WAS STARTING FROM THE WEST'S OWN PROPOSALS AND COMPARING THE SOVIET POSITION WITH THE WESTERN APPROACH. IN THIS CASE, US REP WOULD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT READY TO ACCEPT THIS APPROACH IN ALL ITS ESSENTIALS. AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE WEST HAD PUT FORWARD A SCHEME WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST. SO IF ONE ASSESSED THE EASTERN POSITION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EAST DID NOT ACCEPT THE WESTERN POSITION IN FULL, THIS WOULD BE A PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT.

15. TARASOV SAID THE RIGHT ASSESSMENT WAS BASED ON A DIFFERENT APPROACH, THAT OF ANALYZING ALL THE STEPS THE EAST HAD TAKEN TO BRING THE TWO POSITIONS CLOSER TOGETHER. THE SOVIETS WERE READY TO MAKE FURTHER STEPS, BUT ON A MUTUAL BASIS, IF THE US WAS ALSO READY TO TAKE COMPROMISE STEPS TOWARDS THE EASTERN POSITION. IF ONE WANTED TO BUY SOMETHING, ONE COULD BARGAIN WITH THE SALESMAN. IN THE PROCESS OF BARGAINING, THE SALESMAN COULD DECREASE THE PRICE AND THE BUYER COULD GIVE SOMETHING MORE. BUT IF AT THE VERY OUTSET THE SALESMAN SETS AN UNACCEPTABLE PRICE AND IS NOT INCLINED TO MAKE A CONCESSION, THEN THE CHANCES OF A BARGAIN ARE DISTANT. FROM THE OUTSET OF THE VIENNA TALKS, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD ANNOUNCED AN
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INITIAL PRICE OF AGREEMENT WHICH WAS NOT IN ANY WAY COMMENSURATE WITH WHAT THEY WERE OFFERING. THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. BUT TO ACCEPT PRECISELY THESE CONDITIONS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM. THIS DID NOT MEAN THE SOVIETS DID NOT WANT TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT.

16. US REP SAID THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH WAS TOO HIGH IN PRICE FOR THE WEST. THIS MEANT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MOVE CLOSER TOGETHER. TARASOV SAID HE HAD NOT INTENDED TO ANSWER THE UK REP IN THE INFORMAL SESSION EARLIER THE SAME DAY, BUT WAS FORCED TO DO SO BECAUSE, AS HE UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION, UK REP HAD BEEN SAYING THAT EITHER THE SOVIETS SHOULD ACCEPT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OR THERE WOULD BE NO NEGOTIATION.

17. US REP SAID UK REP HAD BEEN MAKING THE SAME POINT HE HAD BEEN REFERRING TO EARLIER. THE WEST HAD MADE A SIGNIFICANT MOVE IN DECEMBER AND HAD CHANGED THE OUTCOME AS REGARDED WESTERN OBLIGATIONS. THE WEST HAD WAITED A WHOLE YEAR FOR AN ANSWER. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCE, SOME QUESTION WAS BOUND TO ARISE AS TO WHETHER THE EAST WAS ACTUALLY INTERESTED IN PURSUING THESE TALKS. TARASOV HAD RAISED TWO ISSUES -- THE STARTING POSITION OF THE TWO SIDES AND THE MOVES MADE SINCE THEN. THE WEST HAD PROPOSED A MORE REASONABLE OUTCOME FROM THE OUTSET. WHAT WOULD BE CONTRACTUALIZED WOULD BE AN EQUAL OUTCOME.

18. US REP CONTINUED THAT, AS REGARDS THE TOTAL MOVES MADE DURING THE TALKS AND THEIR EFFECT ON OUTCOME, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF FEB 19 WOULD RESULT IN THE SAME OUTCOME AS THE ORIGINAL EASTERN POSITION, WHEREAS THE WEST HAD ADDED SIGNIFICANTLY TO ITS OUTCOME IN THE SENSE OF WESTERN OBLIGATIONS. THE EAST HAD NOT DONE THIS. THIS WAS WHY US REP WAS DISCOURAGED BY TARASOV'S IDEA THAT BOTH HAD TO MOVE TOGETHER.

19. TARASOV SAID THE US PROPOSED TO REDUCE A WHOLE TANK ARMY, INCLUDING 68,000 MEN, WHEN THE US WAS GOING TO REDUCE ONLY 29,000 MEN. THIS WAS ALSO DIFFICULT FOR THE EAST TO UNDERSTAND

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PARTICULARLY IN A SITUATION WHERE THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ADVOCATED SOVIET REDUCTIONS BY AN ENTIRE MILITARY FORMATION TOGETHER WITH ITS ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT AND US REDUCTIONS WOULD BE MADE AS INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT ARMAMENTS OR COMBAT EQUIPMENT. IT WAS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THESE TERMS. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE REALISTIC. THE IDEA OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAD ORIGINALLY ARISEN WHEN THE US CONGRESS WAS EXERTING PRESSURE ON THE US GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM EUROPE. AT THAT TIME, THE US WANTED TO REDUCE US SERVICEMEN BUT PRESUMABLY NOT UNILATERALLY, WITH SOME SORT OF COMPENSATION THROUGH WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THAT TIME, ANY TYPE OF COMPENSATION WAS A BENEFIT FOR THE UNITED STATES. LATER, PRESSURES IN CONGRESS HAD DECREASED. BUT EVEN IN THE EARLIER TIMES, THE SOVIETS HAD NOT REFUSED TO NEGOTIATED.

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20. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE US WAS SATISFIED WITH REDUCTIONS OF FORCES BY EQUAL NUMBERS. BUT THE SOVIETS HAD GONE FURTHER, TO THE BENEFIT OF THE U.S. THEY HAD PROPOSED THE EQUAL-PERCENTAGE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS. THIS MEANT THAT THOSE WHO HAD MORE WOULD REDUCE MORE. BUT THE US APPETITE HAD CHANGED SO MUCH IN THE INTERIM THAT NOW THE US WANTED THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE THREE TIMES AS MANY TROOPS AS THE WEST. HE HOPED US REP UNDERSTOOD THAT IT COULD NOT BE DONE THIS WAY. THE SOVIET REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN APPROACH DID NOT MEAN LESS SOVIET INTEREST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT MEANT THAT THE WEST WAS ASKING TOO MUCH. IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT ROUND, SOVIET REPS HAD PAID ATTENTION TO SOME ELEMENTS IN THE EASTERN POSITION WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. HE COULD NOT PROMISE ANYTHING NOW, BUT DURING THE RECESS, HE WOULD THINK OVER THESE FACTORS ERIOUSLY. SIMILARLY, HE HOPED US REP WOULD, WITHOUT PROMISING ANYTHING, THINK OF THOSE PARTS IN THE WESTERN POSITION WHICH WERE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST.

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21. US DEPREP SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE ISSUE WAS A MORE PRACTICAL ONE THAN TARASOV HAD INDICATED. THE ISSUE WAS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO DEMONSTRATE A REAL INTEREST IN A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME RATHER THAN MERELY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS OWN ORIGINAL PROPOSAL. SO IT WAS UP TO THE SOVIETS TO MAKE A MOVE. TARASOV SAID THE SOVIETS HAD MADE THE MOST RECENT MOVE. US REP SAID THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IN THE TALKS WAS THE LIMITATIONS WITHIN WHICH BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO

LIVE IN THE FUTURE.

22. TARASOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY A WORD ABOUT LIMITATIONS. SOME DAYS AGO, HE HAD ASKED THE UK REP WHETHER THE WEST WAS CONTEMPLATING A NATIONAL CEILING ON US FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE EVEN THOUGH OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE UNDER THE COMMON CEILING. US REP SAID, AS TO THIS, THERE WOULD BE A CEILING ON US FORCES IN PHASE I AND ALSO AT THE END OF PHASE II. SHUSTOV SAID THIS MEANT THERE WOULD ALSO BE ONE ON THE SOVIETS. TARASOV SAID, IF THIS WAS SO, WHY DID THE US SEEK TO PLACE THE SOVIET UNION IN A SITUATION DIFFERENT FROM AND INFERIOR TO THE FRG? THERE WOULD BE A NATIONAL CEILING FOR SOVIET FORCES, BUT NOT A NATIONAL CEILING FOR THE GERMAN FORCES.

23. US REP SAID THIS WAS INACCURATE. THE TWO SUPER-POWERS, THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE A LIMITATION ON THAT PORTION OF THEIR FORCES DEPLOYED IN THE REDUCTION AREA, BUT NOT ON THEIR NATIONAL FORCES. FORCES ON THEIR HOME LAND WOULD HAVE NO LIMITATION AS TO SIZE, WHILE PRACTICALLY ALL OF THE GERMAN FORCES WOULD BE COVERED UNDER THE COMMON CEILING. THERE WAS A BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CEILING ON DEPLOYMENT AND A CEILING ON ONE'S ENTIRE FORCES. SHUSTOV SAID THIS KIND OF ARGUMENT COULD BE USED TO JUSTIFY THE TOTAL REDUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES FROM THE AREA. GERMAN FORCES COULD GO UP BUT SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE LIMITED. WHAT WAS THE SENSE OF REDUCTIONS IN A SITUATION LIKE THIS? US REP SAID THIS WAS OVER-CHARACTERIZING THE SITUATION. IN THE REAL SENSE, THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
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WOULD NOT REDUCE THAT MUCH AND THE US WOULD NOT WISH TO WITHDRAW LARGE NUMBERS OF ITS FORCES FROM EUROPE. THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY OF AN INCREASE OF GERMAN FORCES WAS NOT GREAT AND THE SOVIETS COULD STILL HAVE AS MANY FORCES AS THEY WANTED IN THE USSR.

24. SHUSTOV SAID THIS MEANT THE SOVIETS SHOULD DANCE AROUND WHILE THE GERMANS DID NOTHING. US DEPREP SAID IT WAS UP TO THE SOVIETS, NOT TO THE US, TO CONVINCE WESTERN EUROPEAN, THROUGH THEIR OWN ACTIONS, THAT A FORCE REDUCTION AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS WAS A WORKABLE CONCEPT. THAT WAS WHY IT WAS UP TO THE SOVIETS TO MAKE A MOVE DEMONSTRATING THIS. SHUSTOV SAID THAT IF THE SOVIETS MADE A MOVE, IT WOULD SIMPLY BE SWALLOWED BY THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS LIKE THE FEB 19 PROPOSAL WITHOUT ANY CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION. US REP ASKED WHAT REAL CHANGE IN THE OUTCOME HAD THERE BEEN BETWEEN THE NOV 1973 EASTERN PROPOSALS AND THE FEB 19 EASTERN PROPOSAL? TARASOV SAID IT WAS THE CHANGE FROM THE PREVIOUS POSITION OF REQUIRING THE FRG TO REDUCE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO HAVING THE SOVIETS REDUCE FIRST. WHEN THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO THIS, THE WEST HAD CALLED

THIS MOVE PROCEDURAL. THIS MOVE HAD NOT BEEN PROCEDURAL, IT HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT ONE FOR THE SOVIETS GIVEN THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND. IT HAD BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL MOVE FROM A POLITICAL, MOREL AND MILITARY VIEW-POINT. THAT WAS WHY THE EAST WANTED AN ASSURANCE ON THE GENERAL SCOPE AND TIMING OF WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS. THE SOVIETS WANTED TO KNOW WHEN THE FRG WOULD REDUCE AND HOW MUCH THE FRG WOULD REDUCE.

25. US DEPREP ASKED TARASOV, LEAVING PHASING ASIDE, WHAT WAS THE DIFFERENCE IN OUTCOME AS BETWEEN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NOV 1973 EASTERN PROPOSALS AND THE FEB 19, 1976 PROPOSALS? TARASOV SAID: NONE. RECONSIDERING, HE SAID THE EAST HAD ADDED NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO MAKE THE PROPOSAL CONFORM WITH THE WESTERN DEC 1975 PROPOSAL. AFTER ALL, THE DEC 1975 PROPOSAL HAD NOT COMPLETELY CHANGED THE ORIGINAL WESTERN APPROACH; THE ONLY DIFFERENCE WAS THAT THE WEST WAS READY TO PAY AN ADDITIONAL PRICE
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OF 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN RETURN FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN SCHEME AS A WHOLE, BUT THE WESTERN SCHEME ITSELF WAS UNCHANGED. US REP SAID IT WAS UNCHANGED FOR THE EAST BUT CHANGED FOR THE WEST. TARASOV SAID THE WESTERN SCHEME WANTED LARGER EASTERN REDUCTIONS IN ORDER TO COME TO AN EQUAL OUTCOME. THE EASTERN CONCEPT WAS TO USE EQUAL-PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS TO REDUCE THE MILITARY POTENTIAL IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHOUT CHANGING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA. SO WHAT WAS NEW IN THE WESTERN CONCEPT AFTER DEC 16, 1975? US REP SAID WHAT WAS NEW WAS THE WESTERN OFFER TO REDUCE AND LIMIT US NUCLEARS. TARASOV SAID THE

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PROPOSED LIMITATIONS WERE NOT IMPORTANT. THE US COULD BRING IN OTHER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS FOR ITS OWN FORCES AND ALSO COMPENSATE BY INCREASING THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS OF THEIR ALLIES. THE WEST WANTED THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A TANK ARMY AND ESTABLISH LIMITATIONS ON THESE ARMAMENTS.

26. US REP SAID THE WEST WAS PREPARED TO REDUCE AND LIMIT ALL NUCLEAR -CAPABLE AIRCRAFT OF THE US IN THE AREA. TARASOV ASKED WHETHER THE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES HAD THIS AIRCRAFT. US REP SAID THE WEST WAS ALSO READY TO LIMIT LONG-RANGE US NUCLEAR BALLISTIC SYSTEMS OF A CERTAIN RANGE, NOT ONLY PERSHING AS SUCH, BUT ALL OF THIS TYPE, PLUS THE TOTAL OF ALL US NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE AREA. THIS WAS SUBSTANTIALLY ALL THE WARHEADS IN THE AREA. THEORETICALLY, OTHER ALLIES COULD PUT IN OTHER ARMAMENTS. BUT THIS HAD BEEN A BIG STEP FOR THE US TO TAKE. THE WEST HAD NOT EXPLICITLY ASKED THE WEST TO REDUCE THREE TIMES AS MANY MEN AS THE EAST. THEY WERE ONLY ASKING THE EAST TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL NECESSARY TO GET TO AN EQUAL CEILING. THE WEST DID NOT WANT TO CHANGE
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THE OVERALL FORCE RELATIONSHIP. THE WEST ONLY WANTED EQUALITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND A REDUCTION OF THE EASTERN TANK SUPERIORITY, BUT THIS WOULD NOT MEAN A CHANGE IN THE OVERALL FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE AREA, BECAUSE THE WESTERN OFFER TO REDUCE AND LIMIT US NUCLEARS BALANCED OFF THE EASTERN REDUCTIONS.

27. TARASOV SAID THAT, TO BE OPEN ABOUT THE MATTER, 1,700 SOVIETS TANKS WERE JUST AS INSIGNIFICANT FOR THE US AS THE 1,000 US NUCLEAR WARHEADS WERE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. FORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET UNION HAD NEVER HAD A WAR WITH THE US, AND HE HOPED THIS WOULD NEVER TAKE PLACE. BUT, IF A WAR BETWEEN THE US AND USSR WOULD COME, IT WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND 1,700 TANKS. OTHER FACTORS WOULD BE CONTROLLING. HOWEVER, IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE SOVIET TANKS HAD A DIFFERENT SIGNIFICANCE. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SOVIET HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, THESE REDUCTION PROPORTIONS WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SOVIETS. IF THE SOVIET AND US NEGOTIATORS HAD THE JOB OF REDUCING US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY THEY WOULD NOT

BE NEGOTIATING IN VIENNA BUT IN GENEVA. IN THE VIENNA TALKS, SOVIET NEGOTIATORS HAD TO MAKE SURE NOT ONLY OF THEMSELVES BUT OF THEIR ALLIES. THAT WAS WHY THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT UNEQUAL TERMS, AND THE TERMS OFFERED BY THE US WERE UNEQUAL. SHUSTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF THE STATEMENT THAT IF THE SOVIETS MADE THE FIRST MOVE AGAIN IT WOULD BE SWALLOWED BUT WITHOUT A RESULT. IN THE LAST ROUND, THE SOVIETS HAD HAD THE FEELING THAT THE US UNDERSTOOD THE SOVIET PROBLEM WITH TANK ARMY, BUT IN THIS ROUND, THE SOVIETS HAD FOUND THE WESTERN POSITION ON THIS TOPIC TO BE EVEN MORE RIGID THAN BEFORE.

28. US DEPREP SAID IT MIGHT BE MORE PRODUCTIVE IF SOVIET REPS, INSTEAD OF LISTING THE THINGS THAT WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM, TOLD US REPS WHAT POSITIVE MOVES THEY WERE PREPARED TO MAKE. SHUSTOV SAID IT SHOULD BE AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BE EQUAL CONDITIONS FOR EACH SIDE-- ON METHOD OF
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REDUCTIONS EITHER UNITS OR INDIVIDUALS-- BUT IT SHOULD BE THE SAME FOR EACH SIDE. AND THE SAME COMMON CEILING FOR EACH SIDE, NOT ONE CEILING FOR THE SOVIETS AND ANOTHER FOR THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. US REP SAID THE US WOULD HAVE THE SAME CEILING AS THE SOVIETS. THIS WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. TARASOV SAID A NATIONAL CEILING ON US FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE DID NOT HAVE THE SAME IMPORTANCE AS ONE ON THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT HAVE IN MIND TO REDUCE THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE. IT WANTED THE US TO STAY IN EUROPE. OTHER ASPECTS WERE MORE IMPORTANT.

29. TARASOV SAID THERE WAS A FURTHER REASON FOR THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN MAKING NEW PROPOSALS: THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES DID NOT KNOW THE POSITION OF THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION TOWARDS THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE US REP SHOULD, IN ANY EVENT, ASSURE US AUTHORITIES OF SINCERE SOVIET INTEREST IN AIMING TO AN AGREEMENT.

30. COMMENT: ON DECEMBER 15, THE US REP GAVE THE AD HOC GROUP A SHORT GENERAL BRIEFING ON THIS DISCUSSION. HE SAID THE DISCUSSION HAD FOCUSED MAINLY ON ARGUMENT ABOUT WHOSE TURN IT WAS TO MOVE FIRST. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD QUESTIONED THE USE OF THE TERM "UNIFORMED" IN THE WESTERN DATA PRESENTATION AND GAVE THE GROUP HIS ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. HE GAVE NO REPEAT NO FURTHER DETAILS. ON DECEMBER 16, US REP ORALLY BRIEFED UK AND FRG REPS BUT NOT REPEAT NOT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE DISCUSSION OF DATA IN PARAS. 3-7 ABOVE. RESOR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDEE.

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NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING REPORTS, BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 DEC 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976MBFRV00632
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760463-1175
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19761237/aaaabfwn.tel
Line Count: 599
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS, NOFORN
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS, NOFORN
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29 MAR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <29 MAR 2004 by hartledg>; APPROVED <16 AUG 2004 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: US-SOVIET BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON DECEMBER 15, 1976
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006